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Abstract
In his latest monograph, The Realm of Criminal Law, Antony Duff gives us a fur-
ther, magisterial statement of the vision of criminal law, its procedural framework, 
and its sanctioning system, which he has been developing over the past 35 years. 
This is Duff’s own book-length contribution to the tremendously fruitful collabo-
rative Criminalization project. That project has already generated four edited vol-
umes (Duff et al. in The boundaries of the criminal law, 2010; The structures of the 
criminal law, 2011; The constitution of the criminal law, 2013; Criminalization: the 
political morality of the criminal law, 2014) and two fine monographs by Farmer 
(Making the modern criminal law: criminalization and civil order, 2016) and Tadros 
(Wrongs and crimes, 2016; see also Tadros in The ends of harm: the moral founda-
tions of criminal law, 2011). It will shape the field for decades to come; and it has 
decisively laid to rest a longstanding puzzle about why, within criminal law theory, 
the principles underlying criminalisation had received relatively little attention as 
compared with those underlying, most obviously, criminal responsibility (cf. Lacey 
in Frontiers of criminality, 1995).
Keywords Criminalization · Criminal law · Responsibility · Punishment · Legal 
moralism
While The Realm of Criminal Law is informed in different ways by most of Duff’s 
earlier books, its most obvious forebears are Punishment, Communication, and 
Community (2001) and Answering for Crime (2007). In the former, Duff argued that 
punishment is best justified as a political community’s attempt to ‘communicate to 
offenders the censure they deserve for their crimes’ and, ‘through that communica-
tive process to persuade them to repent those crimes, to try to reform themselves, 
and thus to reconcile themselves with those whom they wronged’ (Duff 2001: xvii). 
And in the latter, taking off from a conception of human agency as the capacity 
to respond to reasons, Duff argued that criminal responsibility is one differentiated 
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normative moment in a distinctive overall social practice of criminalisation. He held 
that criminalisation, taken as a whole, represents the institutionalisation of one key 
idea: that of members of a shared political community answering to one another 
and calling one another to account for alleged wrongdoing. While in the current 
work punishment is set in the background—as a non-definitional aspect of crimi-
nal law—a move which renders Duff’s substantial contributions to sentencing theory 
somewhat oblique to his current vision of the realm of criminal law—the previous 
themes of communication, censure, political community, and answerability remain 
key to Duff’s vision, while the method of rational reconstruction or interpretation 
is broadly similar to the practice conception of criminal law theory articulated in 
Answering for Crime (2007).
The Realm of Criminal Law, however, of course goes well beyond these two pre-
vious works, in a number of significant ways. The—purportedly modest—aspiration 
is to develop not a ‘normative theory of criminalization’ but rather a ‘master princi-
ple’—a thin, formal principle that can illuminate the proper basis for particular areas 
and modes of criminalisation, specifying ‘what could give us good reason in princi-
ple to criminalize a type of conduct’ (p. 3)—a basis that, in contrast with the broadly 
unitary vision of Punishment, Communication, and Community (2001) is seen in 
pluralist terms. The master principle inheres in the view that crime must be under-
stood as constituting a distinctive kind of public wrong nested within a conception 
of civic life that binds citizens together (p. 7). On this conception, a public wrong 
apt for criminalisation is one that represents a threat to civil order. But within these 
parameters, many other considerations bear on whether the reasons to criminalise—
a practice concerned centrally with calling to account rather than with punishment 
(p. 8)—are stronger than those against criminalisation. So, the master principle sets 
out a framework for criminalisation in a very broad sense. Where the conduct in 
question amounts to a public wrong, the master principle sets out a series of further 
questions that the legislator should ask before deciding to criminalise: how impor-
tant it is to criminalise that wrong rather than to respond otherwise; to mark the 
wrong as a wrong, by calling the offender to account for it through a collective and 
public response leading to a categorical judgement (p. 297). The job of the legisla-
tor is accordingly to construct a civic conception of public wrong out of ‘pre-legal 
wrongs’ (pp. 302, 311).
This insight lays the groundwork for what Duff terms a modest form of ‘thin legal 
moralism’; for although crimes are distinctive forms of public wrong, criminal law 
is ‘essentially concerned with moral wrongdoing’ (p. 52): only conduct that is ‘cen-
surably wrong’ should be criminalised. And far from seeing the extensive terrain of 
‘mala prohibita’ in instrumental, ‘regulatory’ terms, Duff claims that even so-called 
‘regulatory offences’ constitute moral wrongs of a distinctive kind: indeed one of 
the striking features of the book is an extensive, if interstitial, critique of the notion 
of the view that a part of the terrain of criminal law should be seen in terms of mor-
ally neutral ‘regulation’. Indeed, in Duff’s conception, criminal law is declaratory 
of pre-legal wrongs rather than—or perhaps, in addition to—being in the business 
of constructing distinctively legal offences. In a sense, one could say that the only 
prohibitory norm in Duff’s schema—reminiscent of Tony Honoré’s (1977) famous 
argument in his essay ‘Real Laws’—is the instruction, ‘do not commit criminal 
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offences’ (see, e.g., pp. 123–125). Moreover it is not clear that he regards this as 
a legal norm or rather a moral or political norm: criminalisation gives the citizen a 
reason to obey; a regulatory offence may be ‘wrongful only because it is prohibited 
by the law, [but] the law that prohibits it is not the criminal law’ (p. 130).
Other distinctive features of this volume include a far more explicit embrace of 
republicanism as the background political theory informing the notion of criminal 
law as defining and proscribing public wrongdoing (cf. Braithwaite and Pettit 1990), 
generating a conception of civil order as political rather than exclusively moral; an 
extended and very illuminating analogy between the norms of criminal law as a form 
of moralised public law and the professional ethics of institutions, such as the legal 
and medical professions; and a far more extensive development of Duff’s response 
to the evident difficulty for any liberal communitarian theory that the conceptions of 
value and wrongdoing that inform criminal law may not be universally shared, even 
among members (I shall have more to say below about Duff’s treatment of dissent 
and of so-called ‘recusants’). And, finally, though the modification is attended by no 
fanfare, Duff appears in this book to have dropped his previous commitment to the 
proposition that penal censure by definition requires hard treatment (p. 224: cf. von 
Hirsch 1993; Lacey and Pickard 2015).
In this review article, I will not attempt to assess the full and impressive range of 
Duff’s thinking in The Realm of Criminal Law, but will rather concentrate on three 
areas in which I find his views less than fully convincing. The first is methodologi-
cal, and has to do with two ostensibly different but in my view in fact related issues: 
the way in which Duff’s interpretive theory or effort of rational reconstruction 
conceives its subject matter; and Duff’s attitude to interpretive approaches such as 
Farmer’s, Alan Norrie’s, or my own, which insist on the relevance of the historical 
development of the institutional practices and doctrines of criminal law. The second, 
which in some ways flows from this methodological point, has to do with whether 
even a modest or thin version of legal moralism can truly capture the distinctive-
ness of criminal law as a system of social norms in the contemporary systems of 
England and Wales, Scotland, the United States or indeed other modern states. And 
the third—again, flowing from what I see as the inappropriateness and even the risks 
of legal moralism as a way of understanding criminal law—focuses on the way in 
which Duff’s account is embedded within a public philosophy of liberal communi-
tarianism in which citizenship functions as the paradigm of full membership in the 
criminal law community. Here I ask whether Duff’s elaborated analysis of the state’s 
proper response to dissent falls some way short of the aspiration of inclusiveness 
explicitly envisaged in his earlier work and an underlying theme in this latest book.
1  Mapping the Realm of Criminal Law
Duff’s book opens with a relatively parsimonious statement of his method of 
rational reconstruction, and with a decisive rejection of the need to engage with the 
historical development of criminal legal ideas and institutions in a particular system. 
He also rejects the claim (it is not entirely clear to whom this is being attributed) 
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that philosophical theorising about institutions such as criminal law starts ‘from 
nowhere’ (p. 4). Duff then gives a succinct account of his approach:
The beginnings of our theorizing are … local or parochial. But that is not to 
say that we cannot hope to transcend those local beginnings, to engage with a 
wider ‘we’ …. Nor is it to say that we must take for granted as an unchange-
able given the particular institutions and practices with which we begin. First, 
we can hope to engage in a process of ‘rational reconstruction’ of those insti-
tutions and practices: to excavate, or (re-)construct, the goals and values by 
which they purport to be structured; to construct on that basis a theoretical 
account of what ‘our’ criminal law claims to aspire to be, and in the light of 
that account to critically evaluate our existing practices, by way of an ‘imma-
nent critique’. (p. 4, footnote omitted)
Duff goes on to suggest that this immanent critique can then be extended by refer-
ence to the values similarly implicit in the broader understandings of polity and of 
civic life in which any system of criminal law is embedded. And he argues that it 
can be yet further extended beyond the boundaries of a single system so as to engage 
with other ‘localized practices and values … with which we find that conversation 
is possible’ (p. 4) and from which we may derive inspiration about how further to 
improve our own system. The core material for this rational reconstruction through 
which Duff aspires to come to an understanding of criminal law as a distinctive kind 
of institution is identified as ‘what I take to be central aspects of “our” Anglo-Amer-
ican systems of criminal law; that I believe is also recognizable in other legal sys-
tems, notably those of other contemporary western democracies’ (p. 5).
There is a common-sense appeal in Duff’s argument. But the more one thinks 
about it, the more apparent it becomes that this way of delineating the terrain over 
which the object to be theorised operates leaves an extraordinary amount of latitude 
to the theorist, inviting the thought that ‘prescriptive’ or ‘aspirational’ rather than 
merely ‘rational’ reconstruction might be a more accurate way of describing how the 
method works. In other words, the normative vision that is distilled by the theorist 
from the vast array of rules, institutional arrangements, and practices involves a pro-
cess of selection that is itself inevitably shaped by norms and values that are also the 
ostensible outcome of the process of theory-building. Indeed, this becomes explicit 
in Duff’s further defence of his method and in his admission that his picture does not 
fit all of ‘our existing practices of criminal justice’ (p. 20). I continue to think that 
this sense that practices are sometimes answering to theory rather than the other way 
around raises important questions about the particular genre of criminal law theory 
of which Duff is such a gifted exponent; and my view here is reinforced by the rather 
axiomatic quality of some of the book’s more abstract discussion—notwithstanding 
Duff’s assiduousness in providing concrete examples—of criminal law as answer-
ability within a moral community (see, e.g., pp. 111–113). Duff aspires to draw 
out from the criminal law a core conception that both informs the social practice of 
criminalisation and generates a normative vision on the basis of which that social 
practice may be criticised and reformed. Duff argues that any normative theory of 
criminalisation ‘must depend on an account of what criminal law is for’, which must 
in turn ‘depend on an account of what criminal law is, what are its distinguishing 
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features …’ (p. 10). But if, as is implied by the very method, the object of the exer-
cise is to produce a theory with robust normative credentials, then the theory cannot, 
by definition, ‘answer to’ every feature of the practice: some parts of the institutional 
practice must be jettisoned as unwise, unjustifiable, or incoherent. And in the selec-
tion of both features to be emphasised and those to be marginalised or criticised, the 
normative frame of the theory itself—the vision of what counts as the ‘best’ inter-
pretation—is implicated. Hence this method is characterised by a certain circularity, 
and a lack of clarity about the precise balance between explanation, rationalisation, 
and prescription.
For most criminal law theorists of a moralist stripe, the litmus test for how this 
methodological issue affects their approach is the significant terrain of strict liability 
offences. These are all too often marginalised as peripheral, or even ignored, in mor-
alist accounts. To his credit, Duff recognises the existence of these offences in ‘our’ 
criminal law, and instead of marginalising them, brings them within the legal mor-
alist fold by insisting that their commission should be regarded as genuinely mor-
ally wrong by reference to the overall master principle of criminalisation: viz., these 
offences have been created because of their impact on civil order, which may on 
occasion be such as to justify their standing as public wrongs. This is, in my view, 
both a more honest and a more imaginative take on strict liability offences than the 
‘marginalise or ignore’ strategy. But when I try to enter into Duff’s imaginative pro-
ject and engage in my own process of rational reconstruction, I have to report that I 
do not find it convincing to interpret the regulatory crime in a ‘moralised’ way. More 
convincing to my mind is the sort of view of criminal law emerging from Norrie’s 
(2014), Farmer’s (2016; forthcoming), or Chiao’s (2019) work, in which the distinc-
tiveness of criminal law as a set of public co-ordinating norms in countries like Eng-
land and Wales today has been shaped over time by the interplay of ideas, interests, 
and institutions (see Lacey 2016). Hence the contours, modus operandi, and role of 
criminal law today is strongly associated with the developing structure and impera-
tives of governance in, as Chiao puts it, the modern administrative state. This is a 
view to which I will return in my discussion of Duff’s account of regulatory crimi-
nalisation in the next section. It is of course an interpretation that comes into view 
far more readily if we think of criminal law diachronically: as nested within broader 
institutional structures that have developed decisively over the last 200 years. Seen 
in this way, the rationale for criminal law as a form of public law is far more distinc-
tive than that in legal moralist accounts, in which, in one way or another, regulatory 
criminal law is always going to be an outlier, or in need of special explanation.
This judgement may, I think, be reinforced by reference to the fruitful profes-
sional ethics analogy that Duff develops and deploys in this book. Codes of pro-
fessional ethics, Duff argues, carve out a restricted realm of wrongdoing relevant 
specifically to the res publica of a profession, and are shaped on the basis of a con-
text-relative conception of what is public (pp. 80–82). What is really productive 
about the analogy is precisely the way in which codes of ethics in professions such 
as medicine and law embody a distinctive set of norms that underpin the pursuit 
of potentially valuable and yet potentially harmful social practices, and in doing so 
express the priorities and aspirations of that practice as understood by its governing 
body or bodies. But we can surely view such codes in this way without thinking in 
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terms of ‘thin professional moralism’: notwithstanding a substantive overlap with 
moral norms such as honesty and integrity, the particular contours of professional 
regulation are driven by the particular goals, needs, and constraints of that profes-
sional practice, and are better understood in these discrete terms than as a sub-set of 
broader moral norms. The analogy with codes of professional ethics, in other words, 
points us towards the political and the regulatory rather than the moral foundations 
of criminal law. Indeed, Duff in some ways accepts as much in his conclusion that 
the restricted understanding of the public implicit in liberal republicanism militates 
away from the sort of expansive legal moralism adopted by Moore (1997, p. 100); 
and in some important but undeveloped concessions to Chiao’s (2016, 2019) and 
Thorburn’s (2011, 2017) views (p. 149). In short, I agree with Duff that, as in pro-
fessional ethics, so in criminal law; but I draw precisely the opposite conclusion 
from the analogy.
Probably the clearest example of the ‘theory in the driving seat’ tendency in 
Duff’s current book is, however, his treatment of plea bargaining (pp. 35–36). Again, 
unlike some ideal theorists inclined to legal moralism, Duff is clear-sighted about 
not merely the existence but also the extent of plea bargaining. Yet, while acknowl-
edging that a realist might regard his approach as a ‘philosophical fantasy’ (p. 35), 
he insists that this reality should not be allowed to displace the centrality of the con-
tested, adversarial trial understood as a calling to account within his overall rational 
reconstruction of criminal law (p. 30). But can this view really be sustained? Given 
that the vast majority of cases both in the United States and in the English and Scot-
tish systems are resolved through some form of plea bargain, the question must arise 
as to whether the trial as a calling to account retains precisely the same place within 
‘our’ criminal law, and of whether any significant institutional change in practice 
over time would demand adjustment of the interpretive theory of criminal law. This 
is where, pace Duff’s distancing of any need to engage with history from his own 
methodological view point (p. 3), the bracketing of change over time diverts atten-
tion from the way in which criminal law is shaped by its dynamic interactions with 
both state structures and social cultures: a process that is thrown into sharp relief by 
a historical (as by a properly comparative) perspective. The growth and institution-
alisation of plea bargaining has, in short, changed criminal law in ways that call to 
be accommodated in any reconstruction of its realm.
Note, too, that my argument that any rational—as opposed to prescriptive or 
aspirational—reconstruction would have to account for the role of plea bargain-
ing within the criminal law is absolutely consistent with the possibility of a robust 
critique of plea bargaining in both its substance and its execution. But such a cri-
tique must grapple with a large range of questions in political philosophy, notably 
in relation to the appropriate priorities of modern democratic states in co-ordinating 
social behaviour and pursuing the public good. Among these would of course be 
questions about not only the proper extent of criminal law but also the proper scope 
of fair taxation. In this regard, it is simply not clear to me why Duff questions (p. 
4) what space historical or sociologically informed criminal law scholarship leaves 
for normative theorising. Indeed he himself cites work by both Norrie (2017) and 
Chiao that establishes the contrary, with Chiao’s case for what he calls ‘pragmatism’ 
rather than ‘formalism’ in criminal procedure (Chiao 2019: Chapter 6) an excellent 
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example of how such scholarship can both inform and sit comfortably alongside 
what I have called ‘normative reconstruction’ (Lacey 1998).
What is at issue here is the relationship between a theory and the phenomena that 
it seeks to present, rationalise, or justify. A hugely important nexus between pre-
scriptive moral and political philosophy and the phenomena that provide their focus 
turns on the feasibility of our normative arguments, that typically depend on things 
like human psychology, the capabilities and responsiveness to reasons or incentives 
of human beings, the institutional capacities of political systems, and the alignment 
of interests in particular social contexts. In the philosophical literature on criminal 
justice, many of the most powerful voices—Duff’s among them—make a careful 
distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory, and temper their conceptions of the 
latter to what they take to be real-world constraints and conditions. Yet, in this book, 
the method of rational reconstruction blurs the line between ideal and non-ideal the-
ory, producing a hybrid ‘as ideal as possible’ theory whose appeal is fundamentally 
one to shared intuitions about the centrality of certain values. It may be of course 
that Duff would want to argue—as, at some points, he does—that arrangements such 
as strict liability and plea bargaining are unjustifiable practices that should be dis-
continued on the basis that they are incompatible with the normative vision of the 
criminal process as a species of moral communication between citizens. But, if so, 
it becomes clear that the boot is very much on the prescriptive or aspirational foot: 
a vision that excludes so substantial a part of the terrain of contemporary criminal 
law cannot fairly claim to constitute a ‘rational reconstruction’. In my view, Duff’s 
conception of criminal law as a distinctive social institution embodying a distinctive 
form of civic life—with its tantalising yet undeveloped Wittgensteinian resonance 
(see, e.g., pp. 87, 160–161)—could have been enriched by a much closer engage-
ment with, say, Farmer’s account of the changing priorities and understandings of 
criminalisation during the course of modern English/Scottish history (Farmer 2016; 
forthcoming); or with Chiao’s (2019) or Thorburn’s (2011) accounts of the role of 
the modern criminal in sustaining co-operation with public institutions or in under-
pinning governance within a particular constitutional order. Note, too, that the prop-
osition that ideas and ideals have institutional and other conditions of existence is 
perfectly consistent with the enterprise of normative reconstruction: it simply invites 
a constructive and open dialogue between such theory and what we know about the 
world. This is entirely different from the claim that everything reduces to historical 
contingencies, which undermine the very basis of theorising complex social prac-
tices such as criminal law.
2  Thin Enough Legal Moralism? The Puzzle of Regulation…
In The Realm of Criminal Law, Duff openly admits the difficulty of reconciling 
extensive plea bargaining with his legal moralist conception of criminalisation, 
‘thin’ and ‘formal’ though it may be. It is nonetheless true that his discussion of 
the matter is relatively brief. According a more central place to a range of proce-
dural arrangements that are commonplaces of what we might call ‘everyday crim-
inal law’—the empirical dominance of summary justice or practices of diversion 
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from the criminal process, for example—would have made it much harder to present 
the legal moralist picture—with its paradigm of prosecution and contested trial—
as a rational reconstruction as distinct from an ideal. The strongly moralised tinc-
ture of his overall vision sits, after all, somewhat uncomfortably with the reality of 
these pervasive features of the contemporary criminal process. Nonetheless, at vari-
ous points through the book, Duff makes a substantial and original effort to tackle 
head on the implications of so-called ‘regulatory criminal law’ for a legal moralist 
approach. In this section, I will step around the welter of distinctions through which 
Duff constructs his particular notions of legal moralism (negative vs. positive, exclu-
sive vs. non-exclusive) and his master principle (which he sees as thin and formal 
yet foundational, exhaustive, exclusive, positive, pro tanto, and primarily responsive 
rather than preventive (pp. 259–260). Instead, I shall try to piece together Duff’s var-
ious interventions on this point during the course of the book, and to suggest that—
like the professional ethics analogy—they should lead us away from legal moralism, 
and not towards it.
On the one hand, not every wrong—not even every public wrong—will call for 
criminalisation: Duff of course envisages the existence of other forms of regulation, 
and indeed argues in Chapter 7 that many current forms of criminalisation—notably 
both certain forms of regulatory strict liability offence and the expanding terrain of 
pre-emptive offences—have overstepped the proper boundaries marked out by the 
master principle. He expresses a preference for the institutionalisation of a clear 
distinction between regulatory infractions and genuinely censure-worthy acts—the 
German system presents a good example of such a distinction (pp. 16–17)—that are 
in his view the core terrain of criminal law. Yet he leaves open the door to regarding 
some regulatory infractions—tax evasion, certain driving offences, and breaches of 
health and safety norms, for example—as appropriately criminalised (p. 70). This 
regulatory criminalisation should in his view take place within a distinctive frame-
work governing decisions to prosecute, which should be taken here not on the basis 
of strict legality but rather of what he calls a discretionary ‘principle of opportunity’: 
i.e., the enforcement strategy should prioritise giving offenders maximum opportu-
nities to comply, with criminal enforcement being invoked only as a last resort (p. 
29). Hence while regulatory offences are indeed brought within the legal moralist 
frame—mala prohibita are genuine wrongs that consist simply in ‘the breach of a 
legal regulation that citizens ought to obey’ (p. 130)—Duff continues to assert a dis-
tinction between ‘real’ and ‘quasi-crime’.
At other points, Duff’s statement of what counts as criminal conduct (civic 
wrong-doing as distinct from harm-causing) is such that it seems inhospitable to a 
wider range of regulatory offences than those canvassed earlier in the book: ‘wrongs 
that require categorical recognition and condemnation rather than … nuanced nego-
tiation (and compromise)’ (p. 212). Moreover his position on strict liability—which 
in fact attracts only a handful of references—is somewhat unclear. His initial state-
ment explicitly states that we should object in the strongest terms to liability without 
fault (perhaps he has in mind here the particular case of ‘absolute liability’, where 
even a due diligence defence does not apply (p. 17)). Later on, however, he argues 
that adjusted burdens of proof and modified fault requirements and penalties, mark-
ing out a particular terrain of regulatory violations within (‘quasi’-) criminal law, 
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may be justifiable within the master principle on the basis of the modified enforce-
ment policy set out above (pp. 284–286). His final position is that such regulatory 
criminalisation may be justified under the procedural conditions just stated so long 
as they respond to:
some significant aspect of the polity’s common good (the need to guard against 
the dangers created by driving, or by industrial manufacturing; or to raise rev-
enue for the public purse; or to protect the immature against sexual exploita-
tion); they will appeal to our civic responsibility to contribute appropriately 
to the (our) common good, and they will show how the regulations are well-
designed to serve that aspect of the common good. (p. 317)
Yet the moralist quality of Duff’s theory in effect constitutes mala in se as the par-
adigm of criminalisation, with all the effort going into the question of how to bring 
regulatory crime within the moralist frame, rather than investigating in any detail the 
regulatory quality of the entire terrain of criminal law. To return to the methodologi-
cal questions posed in the previous section, how would Duff go about persuading us 
of the superiority of his account, as a rational reconstruction, over, say, Chiao’s, with 
its powerfully argued view that moralism puts the boot on the wrong foot, and turns 
its back on a profound transformation of criminal law in modern administrative 
states over the last three centuries (Chiao 2019: Chapter 1)? The question, for exam-
ple, of whether a prosecution policy should be crafted—à la Braithwaite’s influ-
ential regularly pyramid (Braithwaite 2002)—on the basis of opportunity far more 
generally, or of whether institutions such as plea bargaining may have developed in 
part precisely as strategies geared to maximise the effectiveness of criminal law as 
a regulatory system quite generally are not directly addressed, with the discussion 
of Chapter 1.7 somewhat inconclusive as to whether Duff regards the prosecutorial 
discretion that undoubtedly exists across the English system as consistent with the 
democratic credentials of criminal law. Moreover, as Duff himself acknowledges in 
his final reflections on the supposed mala in se/mala prohibita distinction, there is 
no clear line between these aspects of criminal law, since many offences usually 
seen as mala in se have regulatory dimensions that cannot be neatly bracketed (pp. 
311, 313). Yet the full implications of this point are not explored; indeed, they can-
not be explored within the framework of even a thin legal moralism.
3  Dealing with Dissent: The Citizenship Paradigm
Granted that any moral deliberation assumes a set of values that derive from some 
normative community or other, a key difficulty for any approach aspiring to ration-
alise criminalisation by appealing to the substance of criminal law appears to be 
that of identifying a sufficiently rich and shared set of values across the relevant 
territory and of justifying their imposition on those who either are not members of 
the relevant community or—as Duff acknowledges they might—utterly reject its val-
ues irrespective of their membership status. Citizenship operates as the paradigm of 
membership in the relevant moral community, with a central reference point in the 
polity’s ‘shared values’ (pp. 117–118). Duff concedes that a Rawlsian ‘overlapping 
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consensus’ on these values may not exist; and his readers may in any case ques-
tion the place of such an idea within a master principle that purports to be pro-
cedural or formal rather than substantive. Within this vision of a liberal republic 
organised around solidarity and geared to the common good and to non-dominion 
(pp. 196–197), citizens are the ‘primary addressees’ of criminal law (pp. 120–121), 
but the doctrine of jurisdiction implies that non-members may also be addressed 
by the law without disrespect. Indeed, Duff advocates an ‘inclusionary’ concept of 
citizenship within which, for example, a long-term resident is ‘substantially’ a citi-
zen, while temporary residents are ‘guests’, subject to the norms and duties of hos-
pitality (p. 122). But the applicability of criminal law to non-citizens turns not just 
on a legally specific claim of jurisdiction, but also on the moral basis of the law: 
on Duff’s view, criminal law declares rather than creates wrongs, and where such 
wrongs are committed within its polity, they are always the law’s business.
Even if we allow the (dubious) assumption that dominant values can readily be 
identified within a pluralistic society, it is not clear, however, that Duff’s readers 
will or should be entirely comfortable with the extent to which his approach, not-
withstanding its claim to express a liberal vision, aspires to the internalisation of the 
dominant community’s values, nor that she should be comforted by the suggestion 
that the offender be invited to express his or her dissent. Readers may also strug-
gle with Duff’s suggestion that citizens have a civic duty to play an active part in 
the trial. This is an example that stretches the boundaries of rational reconstruction 
given longstanding common law norms such as the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Conversely, the recent erosion of these norms in the English and Welsh system 
has been argued to raise normative concerns about the implications for defendants’ 
autonomy (Owusu-Bempah 2017). The historical association of the word ‘recusant’ 
with religious dissent is perhaps apt given the moralist quality of Duff’s approach, 
but will add to the discomfort of those like myself who prefer to think of criminal 
law in political and regulatory terms. Duff’s is a painstaking and thoughtful attempt 
to balance what he sees as the good of civic order and the liberal impulse to tolera-
tion and inclusiveness. But it is not clear what space his vision leaves for the impor-
tant phenomena of resistance and debate in a pluralistic society—phenomena that 
have, even within the short compass of the last 30 years, brought about fundamental 
changes in the realm of criminal law in areas such as sexuality or drugs—areas that 
should sound cautionary notes for the assumptions of legal moralism. And particu-
larly in a world in which the dangers of demonising groups constructed as outsid-
ers—whether because of their migration, ethnic, religious, or political standing—are 
all too apparent, we should worry about Duff’s reluctance to conclude that ‘a pol-
ity cannot, or … should not, make full membership as a citizen conditional on the 
absence of (persistent) criminal behaviour—that it cannot, or should not, exclude at 
least from full citizenship those who persist in violating its laws’ (p. 141).
Granted, Duff accepts that not all citizens will ‘see themselves as sharing in the 
goods that the polity defines as their common good, and see the polity’s civil order 
as their order’, but he does see this as ‘a necessary aspiration for a polity’ (p. 225). 
And while the recusant’s ‘rejection of the associative bonds of citizenship’ (here 
the recusant is defined in very stark terms, as someone who does not ‘identity the 
polity’s common good as any part of their good’ (ibid.)) does not itself undermine 
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her citizenship, with the relevant associative obligations, Duff is prepared to canvass 
offering such recusants ‘the option of becoming long-term guests, or resident aliens, 
rather than citizens’ (p. 227) (though at the end of the relevant chapter he reverts to 
thinking of them as critical citizens (p. 230)). He also emphasises that both the pre-
legal moral reasons to obey the law and the reach of associative obligations to all 
within the jurisdiction imply that recusants remain covered by its obligations, albeit 
as guests or resident aliens. Note, however, that this elaborate argument is itself 
necessitated precisely by the paradigm status of civic membership, itself reinforced 
by Duff’s (perhaps not so thin) legal moralism; as in the case of his rationalisation of 
the existence of mala prohibita, the approach is to incorporate what he sees as outly-
ing cases by reference to what he sees as the paradigm, and not to consider whether 
their scope or importance in fact undermine that paradigm or raise questions about 
the principles on which it is based. In a pluralist society, is it really appropriate to 
regard internalisation of shared civic values as a core and necessary aspiration of a 
decent polity? Vigorous debate and dissent are surely central to any truly open, plu-
ralist society; and this, I would argue, militates against the highly moralised version 
of political community on which Duff wants his account of criminalisation to rest.
4  In Conclusion…
Duff’s book is meticulously argued, to a degree that makes it hard for the reader to 
be confident that she has grasped all the relevant distinctions, and all the nuanced 
caveats and qualifications (see, e.g., pp. 186–187), in an effort to concentrate on 
the central elements of his account. I am acutely conscious of having engaged with 
only a fraction of its comprehensive argument, which spans legal substance and pro-
cedure, doctrinal arrangements and their institutional settings, and issues of legal, 
political, and moral philosophy. For the reasons set out in this article, I cannot fol-
low Duff along the road of legal moralism. But he stands as its most sophisticated 
and subtle defender; The Realm of Criminal Law consolidates his already towering 
position in the field.
Acknowledgements My warm thanks go to Maria David, Lindsay Farmer, and Alan Norrie for their very 
helpful comments on a draft of this paper.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Braithwaite, J., 2002. Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Braithwaite, J., Pettit, P., 1990. Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford.
Chiao, V., 2019. Criminal Law in the Age of the Administrative State. Oxford University Press, New York.
Chiao, V., 2016. What is the Criminal Law For? Law and Philosophy 35(2), 137–163.
 Criminal Law and Philosophy
1 3
Duff, R.A., 2007. Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law. Hart Publish-
ing, Oxford.
Duff, R.A., 2001. Punishment, Communication, and Community. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Duff, R.A., Farmer, L., Marshall, S., Renzo, M., Tadros V. (eds.), 2014. Criminalization: The Political 
Morality of the Criminal Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Duff, R.A., Farmer, L., Marshall, S., Renzo, M., Tadros V. (eds.), 2013. The Constitution of the Criminal 
Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Duff, R.A., Farmer, L., Marshall, S., Renzo, M., Tadros V. (eds.), 2011. The Structures of the Criminal 
Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Duff, R.A., Farmer, L., Marshall, S., Renzo, M., Tadros V. (eds.), 2010. The Boundaries of the Criminal 
Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Farmer, L., forthcoming. Civil Order, Markets, and the Intelligibility of the Criminal Law, University of 
Toronto Law Journal.
Farmer, L., 2016. Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford.
Honoré, A.M., 1977. Real Laws, in Hacker, P.M.S. and Raz, J. (eds.) Law, Morality and Society: Essays 
in Honour of H.L.A. Hart. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 99–118.
Lacey, N. (ed.), 1998. Normative Reconstruction in Socio-Legal Theory, in Unspeakable Subjects. Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, pp. 221–250.
Lacey, N., 2016. In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford.
Lacey, N., 1995. Contingency and Criminalisation, in Loveland, I. (ed.) Frontiers of Criminality. Sweet 
and Maxwell, London, pp. 1–27.
Lacey, N., Pickard, H., 2015. To Blame or to Forgive? Reconciling Punishment and Forgiveness in Crim-
inal Justice. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 35(4), 665–696.
Moore, M.S., 1997. Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Norrie, A.W., 2017. Criminal Law and Ethics: Beyond Normative Assertion and its Critique. Modern 
Law Review 80(5), 955–973.
Norrie, A.W. 2014. Crime, Reason and History. Third edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Owusu-Bempah, A., 2017. Defendant Participation in the Criminal Process. Routledge, London.
Tadros, V., 2016. Wrongs and Crimes. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Tadros, V., 2011. The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford.
Thorburn, M., 2017. Punishment and Public Authority, in du Bois-Pedain, A., Ulväng, M., Asp, P. 
(eds.) Criminal Law and the Authority of the State. Hart Publishing, Oxford, pp. 7–35.
Thorburn, M., 2011. Criminal Law as Public Law, in Duff, R.A., Green, S.P. (eds.) Philosophical Foun-
dations of Criminal Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 21–43.
von Hirsch, A., 1993. Censure and Sanctions. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
